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The Council on Environmental Quality's Guidelines and
Their Influence on the National Environmental Policy Act
Since its enactment on January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) has become the most written about and litigated stat-
ute in the field of environmental law. The Act, which requires all fed-
eral agencies to include consideration of thq environment in their deci-
sion-making by the process of an environmental impact statement, has pre-
cipitated over 400 lawsuits' and has been the subject of a recent book and
more than a score of articles.2 These writings have concentrated on nu-
merous court interpretations of NEPA which have ultimately been respon-
sible for much of its implementation. However, the Council on Environ-
mental Quality (CEQ), created by NEPA and consisting of a relatively
small staff (about 50) in the Executive Office of the President, has also
shared in this responsibility. CEQ, primarily an advisory group, writes an
annual report, Environmental Quality. In addition, it is responsible for co-
ordinating the environmental impact statement process and for assisting all
the federal agencies in implementing this process. As part of this assistance
and by the authorization of NEPA and Executive Order,8 CEQ has published
"Guidelines on the Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements."
4
These Guidelines have grown both in size and authority since the first in-
terim version in April 1970. They were revised in April 1971 and in
August 1973 and have emerged as the primary tool used by CEQ to encour-
age more effective compliance with NEPA throughout the executive branch.
On a less formal basis CEQ has used memos to the agencies and has held
staff consultations during the three-year period to encourage more thorough
and more rapid compliance with NEPA.
1. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-THE FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 237 (1973).
2. F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973) (published by Resources for the
Future, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. NEPA was also the sub-
ject of an unpublished dissertation by Richard L. Andrews, Environmental Policy and
Administrative Change, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1970-71 (Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1972, copy in Council on Environmental Quality
library).
3. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 285 (1973).
4. Council on Environmental Quality, Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973) (the
most recent Guidelines CEQ has issued) [hereinafter cited as New Guidelines].
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This article will trace CEQ's implementation of NEPA by focusing on the
CEQ Guidelines, and, additionally, the memos used by CEQ. The in-
fluence of these Guidelines on the interpretations of NEPA by the courts and
the consequential reflection of these judicial decisions in subsequent Guide-
lines will be shown. Finally, the role which the Guidelines have played
in the expansion of the statutory requirements of NEPA will be explored.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Before discussing the implementation of NEPA by CEQ, a very brief outline
of the Act and its legislative history is necessary. It has been stated that
NEPA has become "the major statutory lever for environmental quality in
Federal Government actions." 5 NEPA has this function because it attempts
to impose a broad responsibility on federal agencies to take environmental
values into acount in their major planning and decision-making.
In creating NEPA, Congress first intended to enlarge the basic mandates
of federal agencies by enactment of a national policy. Very simply, this
policy proclaims that the federal government shall use all practicable means
and measures to protect, preserve and enhance the environment, focusing on
both the prevention of future environmental damage by the federal govern-
ment and the duty to restore and rectify past environmental abuses. There-
after Congress extended this declaration to establish specific action-forcing
procedures for implementation of that policy because it was feared that the
final bill would become an empty utterance unless the law could guarantee
that federal agencies would follow -this new policy. As part of this new
procedure, section 102 (2) (C),6 specifically designed to be "action-forcing,"
emerged and soon became the heart of NEPA. This section requires all
agencies to prepare, for every "recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, a detailed statement" of the environmental impacts
of the proposed action or legislation. In addition to discussing the environ-
mental impact, the statement must contain alternatives to the proposed action,
any unavoidable adverse effects, the relationship between short-term uses and
the maintenance of long-term productivity of the environment, and any ir-
retrievable commitments of resources involved in the proposed action.
The impact statement enables federal officials to evaluate the environ-
mental consequences of a proposed action and to consider these environ-
5. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-THE SECOND
ANNUAL REPORT 158 (1971).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) [hereinafter referred to by its more commonly known
section 102(2) (C) P.L. No. 91-190 (1970)].
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mental values in the final decision of adopting, discontinuing, or changing
the project. In addition, the federal official responsible for the impact
statement not only must consult with any other federal agency with exper-
tise in the area, but also must make copies of the statement and the com-
ments available to the President, CEQ, and the public. Finally, the official
must see that the statement accompanies the proposal through the agency
review process. The foregoing outline of section 102(2)(C) constitutes the
total statutory requirement for an environmental statement. These few
sentences have led to over 400 lawsuits which have either interpreted these
requirements or forced compliance with them. The sparse and imprecise
language has seemingly promoted an elaboration of details by the courts.
In any event, the Guidelines have attempted to address this process of elab-
oration by explaining to the agencies and the courts the meaning of the statu-
tory language, such as: "major federal actions," "significantly" affecting
the environment, a "detailed statement," and "accompany the proposal
through the existing agency review process." Moreover, the Guidelines
have attempted to formulate a procedural scheme for the section 102 impact
statement process, a task made difficult by the almost total absence of any
statutory guidance. NEPA also provided for the gathering of information
on environmental quality, the creation of CEQ and the publication of its
annual report; but these provisions, unlike section 102, were implemented
with a minimum of administrative difficulties. It has been the section 102
impact statement process which has consumed considerable time and has
wrought profound changes in the federal bureaucracy. This has led to the
growing importance of the CEQ Guidelines.
Executive Order No. 11,514
Upon its enactment on January 1, 1970, NEPA was widely acclaimed as
the beginning of a new environmental decade. This event also represented
the beginning of the executive branch's initiative in the area of environ-
mental law and of its commitment to NEPA. 7 On March 5, the President
issued Executive Order No. 11,514 (hereafter referred to as Order) which
directed implementation of NEPA by CEQ and other federal agencies8
This Order was extremely important to the ultimate implementation of
7. Environmental initiatives were in the President's budget message of February 2,
1970 and on February 10 the President sent to Congress a special environmental mes-
sage detailing a 37-point program of policies for federal action.
8. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 3. Although Congress cannot delegate legis-
lative power to the President, the power to make regulations and executive orders for
the proper administration of the laws has been recognized and given effect by the
courts. United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); Jenkins v. Collard, 145
U.S. 546 (1892).
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NEPA in many respects, even though NEPA was designed to be "action-
forcing" and self-implementing. 9 The Order evidenced White House sup-
port for the law and also aided in the eventual court interpretations of
NEPA by authorizing CEQ to issue "guidelines" to the federal agencies for
the preparation of the detailed statements required by section 102(2) (C) of
NEPA. 10 This Order represents the only direct authority for CEQ's pro-
mulgation of its Guidelines, since neither NEPA itself nor any legislative
history discussed CEQ's role as involving the issuance of Guidelines. It
seems natural, of course, that since NEPA created CEQ, CEQ should over-
see the implementation of NEPA by other agencies. However, NEPA, un-
like most other acts creating federal agencies, did not specify that CEQ
could make whatever rules and regulations were necessary to carry out its
purposes. Instead it provided for a series of duties of CEQ, only one of
which could apply to implementation of NEPA. CEQ is to "review and ap-
praise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the
light of the policy set forth in subchapter I of this chapter . . and to make
recommendations to the President with respect thereto."" Obviously, the
Guidelines, which are addressed to other federal agencies, are not recommen-
dations to the President. It is unknown why NEPA itself did not give CEQ
the authority to promulgate Guidelines on the implementation of section
102, but one inference might be that Congress actually thought, albeit
naively, that the section 102 requirement would be self-effectuating despite
its vague terms and lack of clear procedure, and despite the fact that mis-
sion oriented agencies might not comply willingly. This inference would be
consistent with the fact that, until early court decisions such as Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC,12 it was unclear to most of those
who studied NEPA just how rigidly NEPA's procedural duties would be
enforced and how expansive they would become.
NEPA's silence on the role of CEQ raises the question of how much weight
is given to the CEQ Guidelines by the courts. CEQ's authority to implement
NEPA and promulgate Guidelines is derived primarily from the Order and
only inferentially from NEPA, since NEPA was designed to be self-effec-
tuating.' 8 The courts which have considered the question have not been
consistent in their view of CEQ's authority. On the one hand, some courts
9. "S. 1075 thus incorporates certain 'action-forcing' provisions and procedures."
Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237 and S. 1752 before the Senate Subcomm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 116 (1969).
10. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 3, at section 3h.
11. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) (emphasis
added).
12. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Holding of case discussed at text infra at note
56.
13. Hearings on S. 1075, supra note 9.
[Vol. 23:547
CEQ Guidelines
have given great weight to CEQ's determination of the importance of a pro-
posed federal action.
Such an administrative interpretation can not be ignored except
for the strongest reasons, particularly where . . . [the] interpre-
tation . . . [is] a construction of a statute by the men charged
with the responsibility of putting that statute into effect.
14
This statement on CEQ's authority is not entirely accurate since, as noted
above, NEPA was intended to be self-implementing. On the other hand,
courts have also held that the CEQ Guidelines were "advisory only,"'1 5 rely-
ing on Greene County Planning Board v. FPC.'0 The Greene County hold-
ing, however, seems to equivocate on the weight to be given the Guidelines.
Although the Guidelines are merely advisory and the Council on
Environmental Quality has no authority to prescribe regulations
governing compliance with NEPA, we would not lightly suggest
that the Council, entrusted with the responsibility of developing
and recommending national policies 'to foster and promote the
improvement of environmental quality' . . . has misconstrued
NEPA. 17
This quote, like the one above from Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps
of Engineers, is not wholly accurate, since it is not true that CEQ has "no
authority to prescribe regulations" given the clear wording of the Order.' s
There is as yet no clear resolution of the two approaches quoted above.
However, it is at least clear that the Guidelines are frequently cited by
courts as part of the authority for their holdings. 19 Moreover, some courts
do make actual use of the Guidelines in resolving NEPA issues. 20 This
willingness of the courts to turn to the Guidelines for assistance demon-
strates that the influence of the Guidelines on the courts, although limited,
does exist.
In addition to giving CEQ the authority to issue Guidelines, the Order is-
sued soon after the enactment of NEPA also gave CEQ the power not just
14. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 744 (E.D.
Ark. 1971), aji'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); accord, Environmental Defense Fund
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F. Supp. 806, 811 (E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
15. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 2 ELR 20305 (S.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part,
vacated in part, 472 F.2d 463, (5th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Mitchell, 2 ELR 20181 (S.D.
N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
16. 455 F.2d 412 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
17. Id. at 421.
18. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 3.
19. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109, 1113,
1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1177 (6th
Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 296 (8th
Cir. 1972).
20. See, e.g., Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079,
1974]
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to "review and appraise" the various federal agency programs, but also to
coordinate all the federal programs related to environmental quality and to
issue instructions to agencies as may be required to carry out CEQ's re-
sponsibilities under NEPA. 21 This Order created a more powerful role for
CEQ as the implementer of NEPA rather than as mere advisor to the Presi-
dent, as NEPA itself implied.
The Order also required public hearings on issues of environmental sig-
nificance if appropriate, and required timely information, including obtain-
ing the views of the public, in the impact statement process. 22  These re-
quirements aided the policy of NEPA, not clearly articulated but dis-
cussed in the legislative history, of increased public participation in federal
decision-making, a theme increasingly emphasized in the Guidelines. 23  The
addition of these requirements to the procedural duties of agencies provides
the first clear example of how the policy and duties of NEPA have been
expanded by the executive branch's initiative. This expansion appears re-
peatedly in the Guidelines issued by CEQ and overall represents an attempt to
broaden the law.
Interim Guidelines
On April 30, 1970, just four months after NEPA became law, the first
version of the CEQ Guidelines was promulgated (hereafter referred to as
Interim Guidelines). These Interim Guidelines, like NEPA, left the re-
sponsibility for implementing NEPA to the agencies themselves. One pos-
sible reason for this, even in the face of agency recalcitrance, was that the
variation among different agencies' procedures was too great for central pro-
cedure-making on an explicit scale. In addition, CEQ had just come into ex-
istence, and was still relatively weak and unsure of itself. Unlike those
mission agencies which are created by forceful statutory language and
which begin in a very strong and spirited manner, CEQ did not have a mis-
sion, but rather was created primarily to advise the President, initiate legisla-
tion, write an annual report, and receive other agencies' section 102 state-
ments. However, the history of CEQ to date seems to indicate growing
strength and authority in implementing NEPA.
Aside from elaborating on the statutory language dealing with the re-
1087-88, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (court also uses CEQ memorandum as part of its au-
thority at 1090); Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877, 879
(D. Ore. 1971); Izaak Walton League v. Schlesinger, 337 F. Supp. 287, 294 (D.D.C.
1971).
21. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 3, at section 3.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., New Guidelines at section 9(d).
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quired contents of the section 102 statement, CEQ's Interim Guidelines also
defined for the agencies the key phrase of NEPA. Section 102 provided that
all the statutory duties which federal agencies have under NEPA, including
the preparation of the environmental impact statement, should be carried out
"to the fullest extent possible."' 24 The Interim Guidelines interpreted this
phrase to mean that "each agency of the Federal Government shall comply
with the requirement [of NEPA] unless existing law applicable to the
agency's operations expressly prohibits or 'makes compliance impossible. 21
This language came out of the Conference on the House and Senate ver-
sions of NEPA, and was intended to be a compromise between Senator Jack-
son's desire to force full and vigorous compliance by the agencies and Con-
gressman Aspinal's desire to leave the agencies' mandates alone. 26 The
bill's managers in the House, however, adopted Jackson's view of the phrase,
stating that the duties were to be complied with fully unless existing statu-
tory law expressly prohibited compliance or made it impossible. 27 This
interpretation adds the requirement of strict compliance with NEPA to the
statutory mandate of each agency.
From this ambiguous legislative history, CEQ chose the broad interpreta-
tion of the House managers for the meaning of the phrase "to the fullest
extent possible," ignoring the aspect of the compromise and Congressman
Aspinall's views. This represents an expanded interpretation of NEPA be-
cause the phrase applies to the procedural duties of all the federal agencies
and sets a high standard for the agencies' compliance. Furthermore, the
courts have applied this requirement of strict compliance not only to the
duties owed by the agencies in preparing a statement, but also to ensure
that NEPA applies to the broadest range of federal actions in terms of
environmental impact, including as many actions as possible which were in
progress when NEPA was enacted.28 This doctrine of strict compliance has
emerged as one of the key concepts in NEPA's judicial interpretations.
29
This is at least partly due to the Council's definition of the phrase requiring
a real change in the agencies' mandates, a definition partially supported by
the legislative history but nowhere indicated in the Act. The court in Cal-
vert Cliffs', for example, cited the CEQ Guidelines along with the legislative
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
25. CouNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, INTERIM GUIDELINES, section 4, April
30, 1970 (in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, Appendix G (1970)).
26. The conference Report stated that the phrase "qualified" NEPA duties, thus evi-
dencing the compromise, see ANDERSON at 9.
27. 115 Cong. Rec. 39,703 (1969).
28. See ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 49; see also e.g., Environmental Defense Fund
v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
29. 'The phrase 'to the fullest extent possible' has become the touchstone of NEPA
interpretation." ANDERSON at 49.
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history as authority for the requirement of strict compliance. 30 This holding
strengthened the requirement of strict compliance in the Guidelines by making
it a judicially enforceable standard. This broadening of NEPA will occur
again in subsequent versions of the Guidelines.
The promulgation of the Interim Guidelines also resulted in the creation
of a new concept by CEQ for agencies' section 102 procedures-the draft
environmental impact statement. Interim Guideline 9(c) noted this pro-
cedure as an optional device, solely for the purpose of obtaining com-
ments from other agencies which would then accompany the final environ-
mental statement through the agency review process. The procedure of
"draft" and "final" statements is not in NEPA, but arguably should have
been, since for agencies to comment intelligently on a proposed action they
should have a draft or preliminary copy of the statement of environmental
impact. The Interim Guidelines went on to provide that if the draft state-
ment is prepared by the agency, copies of it should be submitted to CEQ.31
Also, it was not required that the draft statement be made public. Only the
final statement and comments thereon were to be made public, with the discre-
tion on timing left solely to the agency. The Interim Guidelines thus treated
the problem of public information and participation in a very cursory man-
ner, without any idea of encouraging the public to participate in the impact
statement process. The public, however, has benefited from the draft state-
ment procedure. Coupled with later requirements of public disclosure, the
draft statement has become the vehicle for increased public participation and
litigation.
Congressional Oversight Hearings
In December 1970, Congressman Dingell's Subcommittee on Fish and Wild-
life Conservation, which had managed the House version of NEPA, held
nine days of legislative oversight hearings on NEPA's administration.3 2 The
hearings came during the time in which CEQ had proposed revisions in its
Guidelines and thus those hearings exerted a great deal of influence on the
revised Guidelines of 1971. The most important issue discussed in the hear-
ings was the timing of public disclosure of statements and comments. Since
NEPA is silent on this issue, CEQ decided to leave this to the discretion of
the agencies. The committee members argued to CEQ that a specific time
30. 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. Interim Guidelines, supra note 25, Section 10(b).
32. Hearings on the Administration of NEPA before the Subcomm. on Fish and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). Oversight hearings are held to investigate the progress and
problems of administrative agencies,
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should be set for all agencies to make their impact statements public and
threatened to legislate a time if CEQ would not do so administratively."
The committee supported their concern for full public disclosure by reiter-
ating the Order's mandate to all federal agencies directing them to "ensure
the fullest practicable provision of timely public information"' 4 about pro-
grams with environmental significance.
Russell Train, Chairman of CEQ, agreed to take the responsibility for the
change, preferring to accomplish this by the Revised Guidelines. The year
before the hearings (1970) had given Congress experience with two contro-
versial issues-the Supersonic Transport and the Defense Department's dump-
ing of nerve gas in the ocean. Both of these were clear examples to Congress
of how easily important environmental information could be suppressed in
controversial cases in order to win the support of Congress. Undoubtedly the
committee did not look forward to a repeat of such incidents. The resolu-
tion of the issue in the Revised Guidelines required that all the federal agen-
cies make the final environmental statement available to the public at least
30 days, and the draft statement available, if prepared, at least 90 days, be-
fore any administrative action might be taken.35
This new requirement has accomplished a number of important results.
First, if a draft statement is prepared for a proposed action, as they are for
most actions, they must be available for public and judicial review. The
public can and has commented on the draft statement so as to produce an
improved final statement, and if an agency has not in good faith examined
the environmental impact, the public can use the draft statement to take
the agency to court. This threat of litigation alone would provide some
influence toward the preparation of a more thorough draft statement. Sec-
ond, the 30-day period for public review of the final environmental state-
ment ensures that the public will have time to bring suit against the agency
if the statement is inadequate. In addition, it notifies the public of the pro-
posed action before it actually starts. In this way, the public knows that
the environmental statements and the bulldozers will not appear on the same
day.
Thus, the new specific time periods represent a broadening of NEPA's
requirements by the CEQ Guidelines. Ostensibly the expansion is internally
consistent with the language of NEPA, since the law had stated a strong
declaration of public policy which is fostered by these new requirements. It
also seems consistent with the spirit of NEPA, as expressed in the congres-
33. Id. at Part 1, p. 67.
34. Exec. Order No. 11,514, supra note 3, at section 2(b).
35. Council on Environmental Quality, Guidelines, section 10(b), 36 Fed. Reg.
7724-29 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Revised Guidelines].
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sional oversight hearings, that the Government should be made accountable
to the people.
Revised Guidelines
As previously stated CEQ worked on the Revised Guidelines during the over-
sight hearings in December 1970. With input from the hearings and nu-
merous comments from agencies and the public, the Revised Guidelines
were promulgated on April 23, 1971, and contained a number of new re-
quirements in addition to the new specific time periods for public dis-
closure. One of these new requirements was the timing of the agencies'
assessments of the environmental impact for proposed actions. NEPA is
silent on when the actual assessment is to be done.8 6 Presumably, though,
to be effective in preventing actions with very adverse environmental ef-
fects, it must come not only before the action, such as the construction of a
dam, is begun, but more importantly, before the decision to take such action
is made. The Interim Guidelines had merely stated that the assessment of en-
vironmental effects was to be done "before undertaking" the major federal
actions.8 7 It was possible under this meager requirement for an agency to
decide to undertake a major federal project, for example, a reservoir and
dam, and then prepare an impact statement, which might show major un-
foreseen adverse effects. The statement would thus be superfluous, since
these effects would be ignored and the entire purpose of NEPA circum-
vented, all while still conforming to the language of the Act.
Fortunately, this loophole was closed by the Revised Guidelines. 8  Sec-
tion 2 requires the agencies to "assess in detail the potential environmental
impact" of proposed actions "as early as possible and in all cases prior to
agency decision" concerning the action. Agencies cannot under this sec-
tion decide first on an action and write the impact statement afterward.
Rather, in conformance with the policy of NEPA, the environmental impact
statement for a proposed project is to be considered by each agency before
it makes its decision to go ahead on that project.
In a similar spirit the Revised Guidelines also emphasized for the first
time the substantive duties of NEPA. In Section 1 of the Revised Guide-
lines it was stated that it is the objective of Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA,
and of the Guidelines to "build into the agency decision-making process an
36. Section 102(2)(C) does state that copies of the environmental statement are to
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review process. These review
processes, however, are never defined and could take place either before the decision
on a proposed action or merely before undertaking the action itself once the decision
is made.
37. Interim Guidelines, supra note 25, section 2.
38. Revised Guidelines, section 2.
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appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of pro.-
posed action."'3 9  This requirement of consideration of environmental im-
pact is a substantive duty, as contrasted with the procedural preparation
and circulation of an impact statement. Thus, according to this require-
ment, mere pro forma compliance with the procedural duties will not satisfy
the requirements of NEPA. This concept of substantive duties has been
discussed by other writers40 and will not be dealt with here at length, but
it should be noted that this concept existed prior to the decision in Calvert
Cliffs', 41 a frequently cited landmark case for NEPA. In a preliminary
way, section 1 of the Revised Guidelines also addressed itself to that sub-
stantive duty of NEPA, more clearly articulated in Calvert Cliffs', to con-
sider environmental values along with other traditional factors, such as
economics, in the agency decision-making process.
The Revised Guidelines included other less major changes. First, agen-
cies must consult with CEQ in establishing their own NEPA procedures, and
these procedures should identify the points in the agency review process at
which consultation with other agencies occurs and statements are made
available to the public.42 Although each agency was free to choose what
procedural route it would follow, the requirement to establish written pro-
cedures served to make the agency accountable for choosing some reason-
able route. Second, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must
comment on all environmental statements by other agencies whenever is-
sues within their authority are involved, such as air or water quality, pesti-
cides, or radiation.43  This requirement, which implements section 309 of
the Clean Air Act, 44 results in better quality impact statements because of
EPA's expertise in these areas. Third, NEPA applies to future major fed-
eral actions having a significant effect on the environment even though they
are continuations of projects initiated before NEPA became law. 45  This
requirement addresses the so-called "retroactivity problem" of NEPA
about which court decisions were in conflict. Some early court decisions
held that if a major project began before January 1, 1970, or if the fed-
eral government made the critical decision before then, as with federally-
39. Id. at section 1.
40. Comment, The Role of the Courts Under the National Environmental Policy Act,
23, CATH. U.L. REV. 300 (1973); R. Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental
Quality under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 ELR 50028 (1973).
41. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court cites section 1 of the revised Guide-
lines at 1113 as part of its authority for the requirement of consideration of environ-
mental impact.
42. Revised Guidelines, section 3(a), 3(b).
43. Id. at section 8.
44. 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1970).
45. Revised Guidelines, section 11.
1974]
Catholic University Law Review
aided highways, NEPA did not apply and no impact statement was neces-
sary even though much construction still remained to be done, which might
cause damage to the environment.46 The Revised Guidelines' interpreta-
tion of NEPA, however, stressed not what kind or how much action had
already been taken, but what action remained to be taken. Section 11 em-
phasized that,
Where it is not practicable to reassess the basic course of action,
it is still important that further incremental major actions be
shaped so as to minimize adverse environmental consequences.
It is also important in further action that account be taken of
environmental consequences not fully evaluated at the outset of
the project or program.47
Since the Revised Guidelines were promulgated there has been judicial ac-
ceptance of CEQ's position, 48 although the "retroactivity" issue will dimin-
ish in importance as those projects started before 1970 are completed.
Among all the many improvements in the Revised Guidelines, there was
one notable mistake. This mistake grew out of CEQ's negotiations with the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) on that agency's section 102 procedure.
In its regulatory capacity the FPC licenses power plants and transmission
lines to be built by public or private utilities. NEPA requires that these
licensing proceedings, which have such a significant impact on the environ-
ment, must comply with the section 102 statement process. In these pro-
ceedings the FPC allowed the utility company to prepare the draft environ-
mental statement on its intended project which was then circulated to the
other agencies and the public. CEQ, in its discussions with the FPC on its
NEPA procedures, took the position that such a practice was not compliance
with NEPA because NEPA required that the statements circulated for com-
ment to the other federal agencies be prepared by the agency responsible
for the proposed action. 49  CEQ also felt that if the FPC did not itself pre-
pare a statement, there was no way of knowing whether the environmental
statement adequately discussed the impact or all the alternatives to the pro-
posed action. 50
46. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3rd Cir. 1971); Arlington Coalition on Trans-
portation v. Volpe, 332 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev'd, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th
Cir. 1972); Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90, 329 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Wash. 1970,
1971), rev'd, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. Revised Guidelines, section 11.
48. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Brooks
v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir.
1971) (court quotes section 11 of the revised Guidelines at 1121 ).
49. Section 102(2)(C) "all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . include
in every recommendation . . . a detailed statement by the responsible official." (em-
phasis added).
50. Memorandum from Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel of CEQ, to Gordon
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The FPC never accepted CEQ's contentions and insisted that it could
rely on a draft statement prepared by the applicant utility. In a gesture of
accommodation, CEQ inserted a phrase in its Revised Guidelines allowing
the FPC to continue this practice, even though CEQ disagreed with the FPC
position. Section 7 stated that a Federal agency should consult with and
get the comments of other federal agencies on the basis of "(i) a draft
environmental statement for which it takes responsibility, or (ii) compa-
rable information. .. ""
Notwithstanding the Revised Guidelines' clause above, the FPC prac-
tice was challenged in court in Greene County Planning Board v. FPC.
5 2
The subject of the litigation was an impact statement prepared by the
Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) on a 35-mile-long
transmission line near Albany, New York. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit decided that the FPC had to prepare its own draft
environmental statement. The court noted that statements prepared by appli-
cants are likely to be "self-serving." This observation was certainly borne
out by PASNY's impact statement, which decribed the 35 mile long, 150
foot wide corridor as not having "any significant adverse impact on the en-
vironment.153 While this litigation was in progress, CEQ advised the FPC
that it would lose in the court suit. When the FPC appealed the Second
Circuit decision, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving the Second
Circuit decision in Greene County as a notable court interpretation of the
federal agencies' responsibilities under NEPA.
5 4
CEQ Memos
During the two-year period between the Revised Guidelines and the New
Guidelines of August 1973, there was much judicial interpretation of NEPA.
At the same time CEQ proceeded to implement NEPA by meeting indi-
vidually with the agencies to assure their compliance and by issuing nu-
merous memos to the agency NEPA liaisons (over ten were issued in the
first year after the Revised Guidelines). These alternately served to prod,
inform and threaten the other federal agencies into stricter and more spir-
ited compliance with NEPA.55
Gooch, General Counsel of the Federal Power Commission, November 9, 1970. Atke-
son added that the decision in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608
(2d Cir. 1965), had reversed an FPC licensing decision largely because the FPC had
not fulfilled its obligations under the Federal Power Act to evaluate alternative site
locations.
51. Revised Guidelines, section 7.
52. 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
53. Id. at 420.
54. See, ANDERSON at 186-96.
55. See, e.g., Memorandum from Russell Train, Chairman of CEQ, to the Heads of
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Three months after the Revised Guidelines were issued, Timothy Atke-
son, General Counsel of CEQ, sent out a memo which did not deal spe-
cifically with implementation of the Guidelines (as had all the prior memos
from CEQ), but instead discussed a far-reaching NEPA case, Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. AEC;50 the first and most famous United States
Court of Appeals decision construing NEPA. The case involved the Atomic
Energy Commission's (AEC) approval of an atomic plant at Calvert Cliffs.
The plaintiffs in the case charged that the AEC regulations and proce-
dures implementing NEPA failed to meet NEPA's requirements. The court
agreed and held that the AEC had failed to comply with NEPA's proce-
dural obligations by, among other errors one, failing or refusing to review
in a hearing the nonradiological environmental factors if these were already
reviewed by state agencies, unless these factors were affirmatively raised by
outside parties or staff members; and two, refusing to consider modifications
in the plans for those plants which were granted construction permits but not
operating licenses. 
7
The General Counsel's memo, while discussing the court's holding and its
implications for all of the federal agencies (not confined to the AEC), empha-
sized the standard of strict compliance which the court held NEPA to re-
quire. According to the court, the phrase "to the fullest extent possible"
meant that agencies must comply with NEPA except in the presence of a
clear conflict of statutory authority.58 As discussed previously,59 this stand-
ard set out in the Revised Guidelines has been applied by other courts to a
wide range of NEPA procedural duties and thus represents a strict and
judicially enforceable standard. In its interpretation of the "fullest extent
possible" phrase, the Calvert Cliffs' court cited both the legislative history
and the language of the Guidelines on the phrase as support for its holding."
In effect, the General Counsel's memo demonstrated to all the federal agencies
that the requirements and interpretations of the CEQ Guidelines would be
enforced by the courts, and that agencies would do well to heed them. In
addition, the sheer fact of judicial review of agency actions under NEPA
was shown to the federal agencies by CEQ in the memo, thus putting the
agencies on notice that the same thing could happen to them as had happened
all Federal Agencies (September 23, 1971); see also, November 2, 1971 memorandum,
infra note 63.
56. Memorandum from Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel of CEQ, to all federal
agency NEPA liasons, July 30, 1971, on "Decision of D.C. Circuit in Calvert Cliffs'
case . . .". For a discussion of Calvert Cliffs' and citations to the many articles analyz-
ing the case, see ANDERSON at 247.
57. 449 F.2d at 1120, 1123, 1127.
58. Id. at 1115.
59. See text supra at note 28.
60. 449 F.2d at 1115.
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to the AEC in Calvert Cliffs'.
The memo also emphasized that part of the court's opinion which found
that the section 102 process required a balancing of the economic and en-
vironmental costs and benefits. 61 Since the statutory language did not itself
require the balancing, the court reached its conclusion by reasoning that
because NEPA demanded that environmental values be considered in the de-
cision process, that consideration means an explicit weighing of these en-
vironmental values against the commonly used economic values. This judi-
cial reading of NEPA, although perfectly sound as a practical application
of NEPA's directives on administrative procedure, certainly represented an
extension of NEPA duties beyond their original understanding. The hold-
ing also extended the Revised Guidelines's emphasis, noted above, on "an
appropriate and careful consideration of the environmental aspects of pro-
posed action" being built into the decision process. 62 The Revised Guide-
lines gave more attention than NEPA did to imposing substantive duties, but
even they were surpassed in this by Calvert Cliffs' which required an explicit
balancing of economic and environmental factors in the impact statement.
When this is realized, the fact that CEQ discussed this holding in its memo
to all the federal agencies becomes very significant. It indicates that CEQ
tacitly endorsed the holding as the correct interpretation of NEPA's substan-
tive duties, even though it went beyond the Revised Guidelines' requirements,
and said as much to the agencies. The agencies were being forewarned by
CEQ that they must comply with this new standard, since it would be
enforced by other courts, although, as stated before, CEO was powerless to
force compliance. Moreover, this endorsement also urged the agencies not
to interpret NEPA or the CEO Guidelines in a "crabbed fashion," to use
the words of the Calvert Cliffs' opinion. Rather, they should endeavor to
conform to the spirit of the Act and to comply beyond the literal words of
NEPA and the Guidelines.
Interpretive Memos
Not long after the memo on Calvert Cliffs', and after a few memos remind-
ing agencies to update their own NEPA procedures (one of which threat-
ened recalcitrant agencies with "unfavorable Congressional and public com-
ment and possible legal difficulties"),63 the General Counsel of CEO again
61. Id. at 1123. NEPA mandates a "rather finely tuned and systematic balancing
analysis" in each case. Id.
62. Revised Guidelines, section 1; see note 39 supra.
63. Memorandum from Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental Qual-
ity to Heads of all Federal Agencies, November 2, 1971, re "Final Reminder on Issu-
ance of Revised Agency Procedures Implementing Environment Impact Analysis Re-
quirements of NEPA."
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issued a memo dealing with significant court interpretations of NEPA.6'1
This memo discussed the following five issues from important NEPA cases,
including extracts from Calvert Cliffs':
1. Interpretation of NEPA as an environmental full disclosure law in
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers.6"
Congress by enacting NEPA intended to make agency decision-making
more responsible and more responsive. The section 102 statement was in-
tended to alert the public and the President to "all known possible environ-
mental consequences of proposed agency action."6 6 This broadens the re-
sponsibility of the agency to include all of the potential environmental im-
pacts and not merely those major or undisputed effects.
2. The need to treat in the section 102 statement the "full range of re-
sponsible opinion" in Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg.
67
In the Cannikin nuclear test in Alaska, some scientists, both within and
without the federal government, contended that the nuclear blast would pose
a substantial danger of earthquakes. In the AEC's opinion, however, there
was no significant danger and they had therefore not included the opposing
viewpoint in the impact statement. The court held that this omission did not
sufficiently comply with NEPA, stating that its function was not to rule on
the merits of the competing scientific opinions, but that the court must as-
sure that the statement sets forth the opposing scientific views.68 The state-
ment cannot, therefore, completely omit any reference whatever to the ex-
istence of responsible scientific opinions on the adverse environmental ef-
fects.
Seaborg reinforces the "full disclosure" aspect of NEPA required by En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers and is analogous to the
disclosure in registration required by the Securities Act of 1933. Corpo-
rations must reveal factors adverse to their image of profitability so that
the public can make financially responsible decisions on their stock. Simi-
larly, by including those responsible scientific views in opposition to the
opinions held by those preparing the statement, the agency decision-maker,
or ultimately the President, can make environmentally responsible decisions
on the proposed project. In addition, the court held that this full dis-
closure meant including in the impact statement any reports of other
64. Memorandum from Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel, CEQ to Agency NEPA
liasions, December 3, 1971, re "Extracts from Important Court Decisions Interpreting
NEPA."
65. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
66. Id. at 759 (Emphasis in original).
67. 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
68. id. at 787.
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federal agencies which might oppose the Cannikin test because of poten-
tial harm to the environment, which plaintiffs alleged existed. This holding
helps to prevent the suppression of unfavorable government reports so that
the public and Congress are not misled by the release of only favorable re-
ports on a project by the executive branch.
3. NEPA requires the inclusion of economic data in the environmental
statements. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers."9
NEPA states in section 102(2)(B) that environmental factors should be
given "appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic
and technical considerations. ' 70 The court felt that the best way to enforce
this general policy addressed to the agencies (but separate from the impact
statement) was to require that any economic claims or benefits accruing be
discussed in the environmental impact statement, along with any critical
analysis of these economic claims by those opposing the project (full dis-
closure again). It could be argued that the congressional purpose behind
putting that statement into NEPA was merely to assure that environmental
factors be taken into account, with the implicit recognition that economic
and technical factors were already receiving sufficient attention by the
agencies. Nevertheless, the court took the words of policy in section 102
(2) (B) and applied them with vigor to the section 102(2) (C) impact
statement. The result, although possibly not what Congress had intended,
converts the impact statement into a complete decision-making document.71
4. Agency initiative under NEPA.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin72 the court held that NEPA
required each agency to research the environmental impact. The environ-
mental statement should reflect a diligent research effort of a broad inter-
disciplinary scope to expose the potential environmental impact of a project.
In Calvert Cliffs' the court held that NEPA imposed a duty to consider less
damaging alternatives. 73 Their consideration "must be more than a pro
forma ritual" and must include alternatives to the proposed action which
would avoid some or all of the environmental costs.
74
Calvert Cliffs' also held that the agency's responsibility is "not simply
to sit back, like an umpire, and resolve adversary contentions at the hearing
69. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
70. 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(B) (1970).
71. Some environmentalists have urged that the impact statement should not lose
its environmental focus for fear that environmental considerations will be submerged
by the traditionally more important economic and technical factors.
72. 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
73. Calvert Cliffs' Co-ordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
74. Id. at 1128.
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stage. Rather, it must itself take the initiative of considering environmental
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the process. .... "I
This conclusion especially applies to agencies like the AEC or the FPC
which depend on private parties to request agency licensing for proposed
projects. The agencies must take the initiative in considering environmental
factors and not depend solely on the private party's conclusions.
5. The test applied by the courts in reviewing agencies' 102 determina-
tions.
In Calvert Cliffs' the court set down a dual standard of review. First,
as to procedural duties, such as preparation of the impact statement, hear-
ings and comments, the court said that if the agency's decision was reached
without individualized consideration of environmental factors, conducted
fully and in good faith, it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse the
decision. 76 Second, as to substantive duties (actual consideration of envi-
ronmental values, the validity of a particular decision to continue with a proj-
ect in the face of environmental costs), the court said that it must uphold a
decision on its merits "unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to
environmental values."'77 Both of these standards have been much quoted
and followed by other courts, despite the fact that the second criterion is
dictum only. Moreover, these standards of review hold the agencies to very
strict compliance. This is especially true when read in conjunction with the
holding in Ely v. Velde, 7s also abstracted in the CEQ memo, that the agen-
cies must not only observe the procedural requirements of NEPA, but that
they must also "make a sufficiently detailed disclosure so that in the event
of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, the courts will not be left to
guess whether the requirements of . . . NEPA have been obeyed.179 The
holding of Ely v. Velde puts the burden on the agency, not the plaintiff, to
provide an adequate record for review if challenged. It seems that the hold-
ings of Calvert Cliffs' and Ely v. Velde, when read together, impose full
responsibility on each agency not only to make its ultimate decision in good
faith and after careful weighing of the merits, but also to demonstrate this
good faith to a reviewing court by a record available to the public.
By discussing and publicizing this standard of judicial review to the agencies
75. Id. at 1119. Similar language was addressed to the Federal Power Commission
five years before NEPA was enacted in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 620 (2nd Cir. 1965).
76. 449 F.2d at 1115.
77. Id.
78. 321 F. Supp. 1088 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
79. 451 F.2d at 1138.
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in its memo, CEQ essentially reiterates an implied judicial warning to each
agency that it must comply fully with NEPA or face a reversed decision or a
long delay. This threat of judicial review offers the most effective avenue
for CEQ to exert its limited influence on the federal agencies' implementation
of NEPA since, as stated before, CEQ is powerless to force compliance by
the agencies.
Another more subtle result of CEQ's discussion of the judicial standard of
review emerges from the context in which it is found. The context is not
as an isolated warning which merely urges the agencies to comply with
NEPA. Instead, CEQ coupled this strict standard of review with the ex-
panded and broadened interpretations of NEPA in those court decisions
which they chose to include in their memos. In this fashion the standard
(or threat) of review applies to all the new judicial requirements in NEPA.
Thus, by emphasizing the issue of reviewability of agency decisions along
with the issue of the agencies' responsibility to take the initiative in con-
sidering environmental values, CEQ suggests to the agencies that they take a
more expansive view of their duties under NEPA, and at the same time
forewarns them that this expansive view will be enforced by the courts.
The last major memo by CEQ on NEPA came in May 1972, over a
year after the Revised Guidelines.8 0 Up until the summer of 1973, the
memo was the primary addendum to the Revised Guidelines to which the
agencies and courts could look for guidance. In August 1973 New Guide-
lines were issued. This memo gave additional notice to the agencies by
first discussing the old and some new interpretations of NEPA which the
courts had adopted, and then by spelling out in ten explicit recommenda-
tions the new duties of the agencies. The ten recommendations put the
judicial holdings construing NEPA into an administrative context to
simplify compliance by the agencies, thus aiding the difficult task of im-
plementation. In addition, CEQ attempted to influence the agencies by
combining the court interpretations of NEPA with its recommendations on
agency procedure. Each court decision, of course, only concentrated on
a few of the major issues involved in NEPA so that, standing alone, its
impact was limited to those issues. Moreover, in the more than 200 lawsuits
brought in NEPA's first two years of existence, many were contradictory
and inconsistent."' CEQ, however, could pick the best opinion for each
80. May 16, 1972, Memorandum from Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel, CEQ to
Agency NEPA Liasions re: "Recommendations for Improving Agency NEPA Proce-
dures". (1972 Memorandum).
81. Compare e.g., Bucklein v. Volpe, 1 ELR 20043, 20044 (N.D. Cal. 1970): NEPA
"would not seem to create any rights or impose any duties of which a court can take
cognizance."; with Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. United States, 2 ELR
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issue and could ignore those court decisions which held NEPA to the
narrow, crabbed interpretation Calvert Cliffs' decried.82
By choosing the more expansive interpretation of NEPA as the basis for
its recommendations, CEQ achieved a more consistent and substantially
broader view of NEPA than even the best of the court decisions, which
necessarily focused on particular issues. This view can then be enforced
in future suits after having CEQ's imprimatur put upon it by plaintiffs citing
the public CEQ memo to the agencies on NEPA interpretation. This ap-
proach was used successfully in Scientists' Institute for Public Information,
Inc. v. AEC where the court discussed and relied on a recommendation from
the May 1972, memo.8 3 In addition, since most of these recommendations
would later find their way into the new CEQ Guidelines, they would have
even stronger force and authority as the administrative interpretation of
NEPA.
Probably the most important recommendation made in the May 1972,
memo was an elaboration of the former "balancing" requirement. When
adverse environmental impacts are involved in a proposed action, the impact
statement should indicate what other interests will justify these effects, for ex-
ample economic cost-benefit analysis and national security.8 4  In this rec-
ommendation, CEQ embraced the explicit balancing policy adopted by the
court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers.5 The
General Counsel acknowledged in the memo that NEPA itself does not spe-
cify whether or not the impact statement should detail this balancing of en-
vironmental and economic considerations. However, the General Counsel
did note a statement by Senator Jackson contained in the legislative history,
which in effect stated that the section 102 procedure would ensure that any
adverse environmental effects "which cannot be avoided are justified by
some other stated consideration of national policy," s to support the recom-
mendation. Additionally, the decisions in Calvert Cliffs' and Natural Re-
20574, 20575 (W.D. Tex. 1970): "It is hard to imagine a clearer or stronger mandate
to the Courts"; also compare Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 2 ELR
20287 (D. Ariz. 1972) (NEPA cannot be applied retroactively where the agency has
initiated its review processes of the proposal prior to January 1, 1970) with Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1970-
71) (NEPA applies even though project plans had not only been reviewed by the
agency but also had been partially implemented).
82. See, e.g., Bucklein v. Volpe, 1 ELR 20043 (N.D. Cal. 1970), on the issue of
judicial review. Bucklein was ignored in favor of Calvert Cliffs' in CEQ's July 30,
1971, memo, supra note 56.
83. 481 F.2d 1079, 1087-90, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80, at 3.
85. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971); see text accompanying note 69, supra.
86. 115 CON. REc. 29055 (1969) (statement of Senator Jackson) (emphasis
added), cited in May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80, at 4.
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sources Delense Council, Inc. (NRDC) v. Morton87 seemed to favor an
explicit balancing policy, lending even more support for the recommendation.
Rather than merely citing and repeating these holdings on balancing, the
General Counsel in his memo went further to elaborate on how detailed this
balancing was to be.88 This elaboration is important in context (although
not judicially enforceable as are the holdings), because it at least addresses
the potential danger of requiring economic data in the environmental impact
statement. The danger arises from the agencies' expertise in the economic
area. Allowing them to go into detailed and complex cost-benefit analysis, at
which they are extremely adept, could result in a complete overshadowing
of the discussion on adverse environmental effects. The memo recognized
this danger and provided that balancing "does not mean that the statement
may be used as a promotional document in favor of the proposal, at the
expense of a thorough and rigorous analysis of environmental risks. .. .
In addition, since a detailed discussion of subjects like economics or foreign
relations could require as much space as the environmental analysis, this
would destroy the focus of the section 102 statement and undercut the pur-
pose of NEPA. Therefore,
[w]hat is necessary is a succinct explanation of the factors to be
balanced in reaching a decision, thus alerting the agency decision-
maker, as well as the President, the Congress, and the public to
the nature of the interests that are being served at the expense of
environmental values. 90
Similar language can also be found in the New Guidelines at section 8(a)(8)
on the "Content of Environmental Statements." '91 Section 8(a)(8) also
provides that the environmental statement "should also indicate the extent
to which these stated countervailing benefits could be realized by following
reasonable alternatives to the proposed action . . . that would avoid some
or all of the adverse environmental effects."19 2 This section, therefore, not
only codified the recommendation in the May 1972, memo but also
added new language to ensure that all reasonable efforts are made, and
demonstrated in the statement, to consider less environmentally damaging
ways of achieving the same economic benefits from a project. Interestingly,
section 8(a) (8) was not inserted into the New Guidelines in the proposed
version which came out in May 1973, but was put into the final version
87. 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971); 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
88. May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80, at 5, 6.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. New Guidelines, supra note 4. The New Guidelines, unlike the old, are codified
in the Code of Federal Regulations, a mark of somewhat greater authority.
92. Id.
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because of comments from interested parties. 93 This comment process by
which CEQ made changes between the proposed and final versions of the
New Guidelines demonstrates the importance of public response to the section
102 process, for numerous improvements between the two versions were sug-
gested by those commenting on the proposed New Guidelines.
94
Another important recommendation in the May 1972, memo, taken from
the holding of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,9 5 was
that agencies should discuss all reasonable alternatives and their environ-
mental impacts in the section 102 statement, including those not within the
authority of the agency. 96 The court in that case required the Department
of the Interior, which had proposed an offshore oil lease program, to con-
sider alternatives such as a decreasing of oil import quotas, a matter clearly
not within Interior's authority. The court reasoned that since the oil lease
was one part of a broad coordinated plan by the President to meet our en-
ergy needs, the range of alternatives to be considered was also broader than
the oil lease proposed. A broad impact statement could have been prepared
on the entire executive initiative, but failing this, the court said the responsi-
bility fell on the Interior Department to prepare one as the first agency to
act.97 CEQ recommended that agencies adopt this policy as a general rule,
including the discussing of alternatives such as taking no action, or actions
of a significantly different nature with different environmental impacts (for
example fossil fuel versus nuclear power plant). 9s By recommending this
policy as a general rule, CEQ again broadly interpreted the basic holding of
NRDC v. Morton, since this holding could be construed narrowly in future
litigation to refer only to similar fact situations where an agency's actions are
part of a broad scale executive initiative such as in the energy or transporta-
tion areas. CEQ, however, endorsed the holding as a general rule applicable
to all agency actions, forcing all agencies to consider the broader perspective
and implications of their actions. This requirement is explicitly codified in
the New Guidelines, so that if they are followed, the holding of NRDC v.
Morton will have wide-ranging applicability. 99
One recommendation which was conceived solely by the General Coun-
93. See, e.g., Letter from Phil Soper, CEQ staff to CEQ General Counsel, June 21,
1973 (suggestions for change in final Guidelines).
94. See, e.g., New Guidelines, section 9(d) and 6(d)(2), both sections put in as a
result of public comment on the proposed Guidelines.
95. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 835; see May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80 at 10.
97. 458 F.2d at 835.
98. May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80, at 10.
99. New Guidelines, section 8(a)(4) provides that the content of the impact state-
ment is to include "alternatives to the proposed action, including, where relevant, those
not within the existing authority of the responsible agency."
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sel's office at CEQ and which did not arise from any court decision was that
agencies should devise an appropriate "early warning system" to announce
the decision to prepare an impact statement "as soon as practicable after
that decision is made."' 100 This recommendation is derived from another
CEQ creation-the draft environmental statement. In order that the draft
statement (which was instituted to satisfy the requirement in NEPA for
prior consultation) be as complete as possible, CEQ recommended that
each agency notify other agencies and the public of the decision to prepare
one. In this way, hopefully, information necessary for a complete draft
statement would be forthcoming from the agencies and the public. In addi-
tion, the public environmental groups such as the Environmental Defense
Fund or the Natural Resources Defense Council are now ready to comment
on copies of the draft statement as soon as it is available, thus speeding up
the commenting process. This recommendation became a requirement in
the New Guidelines. 1' 1 Moreover, as a result of comments received,' 0 2 the
final version of the New Guidelines contained the requirement that in certain
circumstances, when agencies decide that an environmental statement is not
necessary for a particular project, they should prepare a publicly available
record briefly stating the decision and reasons for that decision.'03 Both
of these requirements contribute further to the policy of insuring timely pub-
lic information on agencies' environmental decision-making.
The last new major recommendation in the memo (some of the recom-
mendations merely reiterated the holdings of cases discussed above) was
that agencies should consider using broad program statements instead of
small individual statements in assessing the environmental effects of a num-
ber of separate actions on a given geographical area or the overall impact
of a large scale program such as the development of geothermal energy.
10 4
This recommendation partly expands on the NRDC v. Morton'°5 holding
on broad energy alternatives, but is primarily a new concept introduced by
CEQ. The concept, if fully implemented, will have a very significant effect on
all new research developments sponsored by the federal government and
should foster the technology assessment so necessary in today's technologically
dependent society. As the Council emphasized in its memo, preparation of
100. May 16, 1972 Memorandum, supra note 80, at 12.
101. New Guidelines, section 6(e).
102. See, e.g., letter from group of five environmental organizations, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund,
Sierra Club, and National Parks and Conservation Association, to CEQ on comments
to Guidelines, June 25, 1973, at A 7.
103. New Guidelines, section 6(e).
104. May 16, 1972 memo, supra note 80, at 17.
105. See text accompanying supra note 30.
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these program statements should supplement the preparation of subsequent
statements on major federal actions "wherever such actions have signifi-
cant environmental impacts that were not fully evaluated in the program
statement.' ' 106 This condition would occur in long-term federal programs
with periods of many years between initial decisions on the program and
subsequent actions. CEQ designed the recommended program statement
to avoid duplicative considerations of basic policy questions, while insuring
consideration of cumulative impacts that might be slighted in a solely case-
by-case analysis of the major federal actions. The concept of the program
statement, if recognized and adopted by the federal agencies, thus repre-
sents a major contribution by CEQ under NEPA to the improvement of
federal decision-making.
On June 12, 1973, the first appellate court opinion on the application of
NEPA to government research and development programs was given by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Scien-
tists' Institute for Public Information (SIPI) v. AEC.10 7 The court was asked
in that case to determine the applicability of NEPA to the AEC's research and
development program for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, a large and
complex program for which CEQ's broad program statement would be
particularly appropriate. The AEC contended that NEPA required the
preparation of impact statements only for individual facilities of the program,
and not for the entire research and development program itself. The court,
however, decided that the policy of NEPA 0 s required an environmental
impact statement on the entire program, and cited the CEQ memorandum
recommendation on broad program statements as part of the authority for
its holding.' 0 9 The case should provide primary authority in this hitherto
unresolved area of NEPA, and, as was evident from the court's opinion, it
should apply to a wide range of federally supported technology development
programs in addition to the breeder reactor.
The New Guidelines incorporated the holding of SIPI v. AEC in a long
section directly following its provision-also put into the Guidelines from the
memo-on broad program statements. 110  The section states that agencies
engaging in major technology research and development programs should
formulate procedures for determining when a program statement is required.
106. May 16, 1972 memo, supra note 80, at 18.
107. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
108. NEPA, section 101(a), 42 U.S.C. 4331 states "The Congress recognizes the pro-
found impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural
environment, particularly the profound influences of ... new and expanding technolog-
ical advances. .. "
109. 481 F.2d at 1090.
110. New Guidelines at 6(d)(1) and (2).
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As to the timing of these statements, the section provides in language similar
to the court opinion that:
Statements must be written late enough in the development proc-
ess to contain meaningful information but early enough so that
this information can practically serve as an input in the decision-
making process."'
The Guidelines then go on to elaborate the factors involved in any determi-
nation to prepare a program statement and also the content of that pre-
pared statement.
The foregoing process by which -the concept of technological development
and program statements is now required of all agencies in their compliance
with the law, notwithstanding that it is nowhere found in the statutory
language in NEPA, underlines the interesting chronology of the Act's ex-
pansion into new areas. The holding of NRDC v. Morton in early 1972
discussed the need to consider a broad range of alternatives whenever the
proposed action is an integral part of a broad federal program. Then, in
May 1972, CEQ recommended to agencies that in certain situations broad
program statements would be appropriate in order to properly assess the
full scope of the environmental impact. This recommendation drew on the
ideas of NRDC v. Morton and made them applicable to a wider range of
agency actions. This recommendation in turn served as one of the bases for
the court's holding in SIPI v. AEC that in large technology development
programs, broad program statements are required under NEPA in addition
to subsequent individual statements. Finally, the holding of SIPI v. AEC
was codified in the CEQ Guidelines, thus transforming a policy concept into
a new legal requirement. The process resembles a feedback loop whereby
a new position taken by CEQ induces a corresponding change in the court
decisions, which in turn produces a further change in the CEQ interpretation
of NEPA. This process has taken place throughout the three years of
NEPA's life. 112 Moreover, without ever appearing on the surface of the
Guidelines, this relationship between CEQ and the courts has been an
intimate part of the process of NEPA's growth.
New Guidelines
The New Guidelines issued in August 1973 substantially changed the revised
111. Id. at 6(d) (2). For a discussion of the program statement and its importance,
see ANDERSON at 290.
112. See, e.g., explicit balancing requirement of May 16, 1972 memo, see text ac-
companying notes 85-93 supra; and emphasis in Revised Guidelines on public informa-
tion (section 10(b)), emphasized in Calvert Cliffs', and then reemphasized more ex-
plicitly in New Guidelines (section 9(d)).
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Guidelines. In terms of pages alone it had doubled in size. Yet, much of the
New Guidelines was not really new, having been introduced by CEQ in its
memos to other agencies, as previously discussed. The CEQ recommenda-
tions, incorporated into the New Guidelines, include the explicit balancing
in the impact statement of environmental and economic factors,113 the em-
phasis on NEPA's substantive policy requirements, 1 4 increased public par-
ticipation in the 102 process,"" the required, not optional draft state-
ment," 6 the duty to include responsible opposing viewpoints,' 7 and the
broad program statements." 8
Of the provisions which were actually new in the New Guidelines, the
most important were probably the following:
1. For those legislative proposals of environmental significance, the
Guidelines provided that agencies should prepare impact statements on the
proposals before submission to the Office of Management and Budget for
clearance. 119 This reiterates the statutory requirement of NEPA which had
not been emphasized as strongly in prior Guidelines. 120 These legislative
impact statements could be of major importance in giving Congress a clearer
insight into potential environmental problems before it passes legislation.
2. Agencies should consider in their environmental statements the im-
pact of the proposed action on energy conservation.
121
3. "The procedures established by these guidelines are designed to en-
courage public participation in the impact statement process at the earliest
possible time.' 122 This hortatory language was put in largely at the request
of those environmental groups that sought to involve the public in com-
menting on agencies' draft statements.
4. The draft statement is not only required, but it also must "fulfill and
satisfy to the fullest extent possible at the time the draft is prepared the re-
quirements established for final statements .... ,1123 The purpose of this
provision was to improve the quality of all impact statements by making the
draft statement more complete.
5. The Council deleted the provision allowing the FPC to rely on appli-
113. New Guidelines at section 8(a)(8).
114. Id. at 2(b), 1(a).
115. Id. at 9(d), 6(e).
116. Id. at 7(a).
117. Id. at 10(a).
118. Id. at 6(d).
119. Id. at 12(a).
120. NEPA, section 102(2)(C): "Include in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement..
121 New Guidelines at 8(a) (iii).
122. Id. at 9(d).
123. Id. at 7(a).
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cant's impact statements which was overturned in Greene County v. FPC.124
The new Guidelines also provided that an agency "should make its own
evaluation of the environmental issues and take responsibility for the scope
and content of draft and final environmental statements,' 1 25 thus imple-
menting the holding of Greene County and insuring that statements are more
complete and less self-serving.
Conclusion
An examination of the history of the CEQ Guidelines and some of the more
important court decisions interpreting NEPA demonstrates that the Guide-
lines are no ordinary set of administrative regulations. As an ad-
ministrative determination of NEPA, they are not simply parallel to and
separate from the judicial interpretations of NEPA, but are instead a kind of
hybrid creation-an administrative-judicial gloss on the statutory language
of NEPA. Given the advisory position of CEQ with respect to the imple-
mentation of NEPA, as contrasted with the position of those mission agen-
cies of the federal government, the Guidelines draw their strength from
their consolidation of important cases under NEPA, i.e. a codification of ju-
dicial interpretation. This strength is seen in the influence which the Guide-
lines have exerted in past NEPA cases in various areas of statutory inter-
pretation. Thus, CEQ has exerted its influence over other, far larger federal
agencies by its ability to first influence the courts. However, the overall
influence to date has been limited. Although some courts have cited the
CEQ Guidelines or memorandum recommendations for support, they have
never explicitly directed agencies to follow the Guidelines, nor have they
clearly identified the weight which an agency should attach to the Guidelines.
Thus, CEQ by a process of consolidation of cases, combined with its own
initiative, has supplemented NEPA's requirements in order to fulfill the
legislative purposes behind NEPA. Through its Guidelines it has clarified
and detailed the procedure which federal agencies should follow in complying
with NEPA. Unfortunately, the true potential of CEQ in affecting major
changes in agency-NEPA procedures has never been fully utilized. How-
ever, the court holdings to date and the CEQ Guidelines have transformed
NEPA from a simple mechanism for implementing congressional policy
into a strong mandate for environmentally responsible federal decision-
making.
Herbert F. Stevens
124. See text accompanying note 52, supra.
125. New Guidelines at 7(c).
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